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KOREA’S MONEY MARKET
By Dominique Dwor-Frécaut
Korea’s Money Market
Korea’s money market includes the call market as well 
as markets for monetary stabilization bonds (MSBs), 
negotiable certifi cates of deposit (CDs), repurchase 
agreements (repos), commercial paper (CP), and cover 
bills (CB). Korea’s money market so far seems to have 
been relatively immune to the global credit crunch 
generated by the crisis in the U.S. subprime mortgage 
markets. Korean interbank rates are rising, however, 
which suggests that banking liquidity remains tight 
(Table 1).
tant player in this market because of its importance for 
monetary policy. Monetary policy in Korea consists of 
targeting a level of infl ation decided by the BOK every 
year. The BOK’s monetary policy committee (MPC) 
meets every month to decide on a target for the over-
night call rate that is consistent with its infl ation target. 
In 2007 and 2008, the BOK has targeted infl ation to 
remain in a 2.5–3.5 percent range. The overnight call 
rate is currently at 5 percent (Figure 1).
After the MPC decides on an appropriate target for 
the overnight call rate, BOK staff implement that 
target through adding liquidity to or withdrawing it 
from the call market. Banks are required to maintain 
reserves with the BOK, but these reserves can in-
crease or fall because of factors such as private sector 
transactions, government transactions, or purchases 
of foreign currencies by the central bank. The BOK 
forecasts the change in banks’ reserves arising from 
various sources, compares it with the required level 
of reserves, and computes the scale of the surplus or 
shortage of reserves before it fi nalizes the scale of its 
market operations. Until recently, the actual call rate 
has generally been above the target, which suggests 
the BOK has maintained tight liquidity conditions in 
the call market.
MSB and Repo Markets
Until recently, MSB issuance was the main instru-
ment used by the BOK to control liquidity. MSBs 
are liabilities issued by the central bank to soak up 
liquidity. They are issued in 11 different maturities 
ranging from 14 days to two years. Once issued, they 
are not, in principle, redeemable prior to maturity. The 
ceiling on the volume of MSBs that may be legally 
issued is set at 50 percent of broad money (M2), but 
in November 2007 the BOK announced it would issue 
quarterly ceilings on the amount to be issued, within 
the 50 percent ceiling. MSBs are sold through auctions 
to fi nancial institutions selected by the BOK on the 
basis of asset quality and fi nancial soundness. In 2007, 
these numbered approximately 50.
Table 1: Money Market Trends in Korea,
1990–June 2006, in trillions of Korean won
1990 2000 2004 2005
2006
(June)
Call
marketa
3.6 12.9 27.5 34.6 30.4 
Monetary 
stabilization 
bonds
15.2 66.4 142.8 155.2 157.5 
Certificates 
of deposit 
6.8 14.2 43.5 63.8 66.8 
Repurchase 
agreements 
3.4 26.3 34.6 42.9 52.2 
Commercial 
paper 
22.7 9.1 15.9 20.0 23.0 
Cover bills 0.2 11.2 3.9 4.0 3.9 
Source: Bank of Korea data. 
a Daily average transactions during the last month in  
the period. 
Call Market
The call market is the market in which funds are traded 
in the shortest periods (typically overnight loans) to 
adjust for temporary surpluses or shortages of funds 
among fi nancial institutions. All types of fi nancial 
institutions in Korea, including commercial banks, 
security companies, insurance, investment trust, credit 
unions, and branches of foreign banks, participate in 
the call market. The Bank of Korea (BOK) is an impor-
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Figure 2: Monetary Stabilization Bonds 
Outstanding in Korea, December 
2002–November 2007
Source: CEIC Data Company, Ltd.
The ratio of MSBs outstanding to M2 has been falling; 
it was 12.6 percent in November 2007, down from a 
peak of 16.7 percent in March 2005 (Figure 2). In 
absolute levels, MSBs outstanding fell to 152.2 tril-
lion won in November 2007, from 161.6 trillion won 
in March 2005. This refl ects the shifting of liquidity 
management to other instruments largely out of con-
cerns over the cost of foreign exchange intervention 
and liquidity management to the central bank.
In 2006, the central bank made a loss of 1.8 trillion 
won, which largely refl ects large-scale intervention 
in the foreign exchange (FX) market. To prevent the 
Korean won from appreciating, the BOK had been 
purchasing large quantities of U.S. dollars and, until 
recently, had been issuing large quantities of MSBs 
to mop up the liquidity created by its purchases of 
U.S. dollars. The BOK losses refl ect that the inter-
est it earns on its FX reserves—in 2006 this was 8.6 
trillion won—is barely enough to fund the interest it 
has to pay on MSBs and repos, which was 8 trillion 
won in 2006. In addition, because the BOK holds 
substantial FX reserves, currently $261.5 billion or 
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Figure 1: Bank of Korea Target and Actual Overnight Call Rates, percentage
Source: Bloomberg.
about 27 percent of Korea’s GDP, each time the won 
appreciates, the BOK makes substantial won capital 
losses on its FX holdings.
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To reduce the costs associated with FX intervention, 
the BOK has tried to reduce the costs of sterilizing 
that intervention. First the BOK has started using the 
cross-currency swap market for liquidity management 
(a cross-currency swap is an exchange of cash fl ows in 
one currency against cash fl ows in another currency). 
For instance, instead of issuing MSBs to mop up the 
liquidity created by its purchases of FX, the BOK has 
instead borrowed from the Korean won market and lent 
on the onshore U.S. dollar market, in effect it “paid 
the swap.” (The combination of spot FX intervention 
and sterilization through the swap market is in effect 
equivalent to intervention on the forward FX market.) 
In November 2007, the outstanding swaps of the BOK 
represented $22.7 billion, or the equivalent of 24.5 
trillion Korean won.
Second, the BOK has reduced the size of its direct 
lending operations: in November 2007, direct lending 
by the BOK represented 6.4 trillion Korean won, down 
from 8.6 trillion won in February 2006. This lending is 
extended at subsidized rates to commercial banks to be 
on lent to small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), 
an arrangement that refl ects the BOK’s past role as a 
policy bank that is gradually being phased out. This 
reduction has allowed the BOK to limit the expansion 
of its balance sheet and hence the provision of liquid-
ity to the economy. Because of reserve requirements, 
banks need central bank liquidity in order to expand 
credit; a smaller central bank balance sheet—that is, 
less central bank liquidity in the economy—limits 
credit expansion.
Third, the BOK raised reserve requirements in No-
vember 2006 to an average of 3.8 percent (up from 3 
percent) for deposits in Korean won and to 7 percent 
(up from 5 percent) on foreign currency deposits. By 
raising reserve requirements, the BOK has in effect 
lowered the credit multiplier, that is, the increase in 
credit generated by an increase in central bank liquid-
ity. In addition, because reserves are not remunerated 
(by contrast, the BOK has to pay market rates on the 
MSBs it issues), by raising reserve requirements the 
BOK is in effect shifting the cost of liquidity manage-
ment to the banking system (and ultimately to deposi-
tors and borrowers).
Fourth, the BOK has increased its reliance on repos. A 
repo is a form of collateralized lending: one party sells 
a security to another party and agrees to repurchase it 
on a specifi ed date for a specifi ed price. To withdraw 
liquidity from the market, the BOK has been doing 
repos mainly with banks. In 2006, the BOK widened 
the range of securities eligible for the repo market and 
lengthened the maturities to 14 days from the previous 
shorter maturities. Financial institutions that engage 
in the call market are eligible to participate in repo 
transactions among themselves. The Korea Money 
Broker Corporation, the Korea Inter Dealer Broker-
age Corporation, the Seoul Money Brokerage Service, 
and securities companies operate as intermediaries. 
At the end of 2006, the outstanding repos of the BOK 
were 25.1 trillion won, up from 15.8 trillion won at 
end of 2005.
Starting in March 2008, the BOK intends to switch 
its policy rate to the seven-day repo rate from the 
overnight call rate. The BOK feels that banks have 
become too reliant on the overnight call rate to man-
age their liquidity and that, as a result, its intervention 
on the call market has been too one sided, that is, it 
has been a net supplier of liquidity. The central bank 
expects that the move to the seven-day repo will spur 
commercial banks to better manage their liquidity and 
help the development of money markets as well as 
improve the linkage between short- and longer-term 
rates. On the other hand, the switch to the seven-day 
repo could increase the cost of short-term funding 
to the banks because they will have to acquire more 
collateral—government bonds—in order to have ac-
cess to liquidity.
The CD, Commercial Paper, and Promissory Note 
Markets
Negotiable CDs are negotiable debt instruments sold 
by banks to depositors at a discount, with the face value 
being paid at maturity. The CD market consists of the 
issuing banks, intermediaries, and investors. All banks 
(except the Export-Import Bank of Korea) are allowed 
to issue CDs. Intermediary businesses are usually 
handled by securities companies and merchant banks. 
Tenors of up to 12 months are liquid, and the 91-day 
CD is the benchmark normally used for fl oating rates 
index benchmarks—for example, for interest rate swap 
fi xing (an interest rate swap is a contract that allows 
investors to exchange a stream of fi xed interest pay-
ments against a stream of fl oating interest payments) 
or for consumer or SME lending rates.
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Table 2: Korea’s Foreign Exchange Market,
2001–2006, in trillions of Korean won
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Spot 53.2 5 5 8 9 10.7 6.1 6.1 6.8 27.5 
Forwards 11.3 1 2 2 3 52.5 0.7 9.6 6.1 0.8 
Swaps 49.5 1 3 5 6 79.6 0.1 1.6 4.7 7.5 
Total 
deriva-
tives 
60.8 3 5 8 1 12.1 0.8 1.2 00.8 28.3 
Total 
spot and 
deriva-
tives 
114.0 8 1 1 1 22.8 06.9 67.3 97.6 55.8 
Source: Bank of Korea.
CD issuance has increased sharply during the past 
year: banks’ outstanding CDs represented 66.5 trillion 
won in October 2007, compared with 36.4 trillion won 
a year ago (Figure 3). This refl ects the fast growth 
in bank lending, especially to SMEs, which has not 
been matched by a commensurate expansion in bank 
deposits. As a result, banks have been getting their 
marginal funding from the CD market, which has 
driven up CD rates.
raising short-term funds. In general, only companies 
with credit ratings exceeding a certain level are al-
lowed to fl oat CP. Transactions in the CP market are 
made primarily by fi nancial institutions for holding or 
for sale to investors.
Cover bills are promissory notes newly issued and held 
by fi nancial institutions after the division or combina-
tion of underlying commercial bills, trade bills, and 
factoring in discounted receivables. Banks, merchant 
banking corporations, and mutual savings and fi nance 
companies are able to issue CBs. CBs are purchased 
by fi nancial institutions and corporations rather than 
by individuals.
Korea’s Foreign Exchange Market
Korea’s FX markets have seen fast growth in recent 
years thanks to capital account and fi nancial liberaliza-
tion. But Korea is only the fi fth-largest FX market in 
non-Japan Asia, with 0.8 percent of global turnover. 
To reach its goal of becoming the fi nance and logistics 
hub of Northeast Asia, Korea will need to provide a 
stable, business-friendly environment to support the 
development of its FX market.
In Line with Global Trends
Korea’s FX market has grown strongly during the past 
few years (Table 2). Total spot and derivatives turnover 
increased by 220 percent during 2001–06, with spot 
turnover increasing by 240 percent and derivatives 
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Figure 3: Certificates of Deposit Outstanding 
and Three-Month CD Rates in Korea, 
November 2004–November 2007
CDs outstanding
(won, trillions)
CDs outstanding
Three-month CD rate
(percentage)
Three-month CD rate
Sources: Bloomberg; CEIC Data Company, Ltd.
The increase in the CD rate since August 2007 is 
also likely to refl ect global markets’ uncertainty and 
volatility. With the size and distribution of the losses 
associated with the U.S. subprime mortgage market 
crisis still largely unknown, global interbank markets 
have become frozen as banks are reluctant to lend to 
each other out of concerns over impaired capital po-
sitions. As a result, global spreads between interbank 
rates and Treasury bills are at a historic high. Although 
Korean commercial banks have only a very limited 
direct exposure to subprime-related paper, their reli-
ance on market funding rather than depositor funding 
leaves them open to the risk of a loss of confi dence in 
the interbank market. As a result, since August 2007, 
Korean interbank rates seem to have become more 
correlated with global interbank rates.
Commercial paper is an accommodation bill issued by 
companies with sound credit status for the purpose of 
                 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS              25
turnover increasing by 210 percent. The volume of 
derivatives trading in Korea is roughly equal to the 
volume of spot trading. This is in line with global 
trends: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
triennial survey of foreign global exchange markets 
found that during 2001–07 global FX turnover in spot 
and derivatives had increased by 260 percent. Global 
turnover in forwards and swaps at $2.1 trillion is now 
twice as large as global spot turnover at $1 trillion.
The BIS survey shows that in 2007 the fi ve largest FX 
trading centers represented nearly 70 percent of world 
turnover (Figure 4). In non-Japan Asia, the largest 
FX market is in Singapore, which refl ects its role as 
regional fi nancial center. FX turnover in Singapore 
represented nearly 6 percent of world turnover in 2007. 
By contrast, Korea is only the fi fth-largest exchange 
rate market in non-Japan Asia, behind Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Australia, and India (Figure 5). Accord-
ing to the BIS, Korea’s FX market turnover in 2007 
represented 0.8 percent of total global FX turnover.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
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United
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Japan
Singapore
Percentage
Figure 4: The World’s Five Largest Foreign 
Exchange Markets, 2001 and 2007, 
percentage
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Development Spurred by Financial and Capital 
Account Liberalization
Korea’s FX market development refl ects fi nancial 
liberalization and the opening of the capital account 
after the 1997 crisis. In December 1997 Korea shifted 
to a free-fl oating exchange rate system. In May 1998, 
the ceiling on foreign investment in Korean equities 
was abolished, and the local bond markets and money 
markets were fully opened to foreign investors.
In June 1998, the government announced a plan to 
liberalize all FX transactions in two stages. The fi rst 
stage of liberalization took effect on 1 April 1999 
with the introduction of the new Foreign Exchange 
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Figure 5: The 10 Largest Foreign Exchange 
Markets in Asia (excluding Japan), 2001 and 
2007, percentage of world foreign exchange 
market
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Percentage
26 THE KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE       
Transaction Act. Except for a few types of transactions, 
current account transactions by corporations and banks 
were fully liberalized. Regulations on capital account 
transactions were converted into a negative system, 
and, thereby, the permission requirement was lifted 
except in the cases of transactions for which it was 
stipulated by law or decree. Foreign participation in 
the FX derivatives market was liberalized. Overseas 
borrowings with maturities of less than one year by 
fi nancially sound domestic corporations were allowed. 
Regulations on foreign direct investment (FDI) were 
streamlined in order to match the standards of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment. Nonresidents were allowed to make deposits 
and open trust accounts denominated in Korean won 
with maturities of more than one year.
The second stage of liberalization took effect on 1 
January 2001. The remaining ceilings on current ac-
count transactions by individuals were eliminated, 
including the ceilings on overseas travel expenses, 
emigration expenses, withdrawals of domestic as-
sets by nonresident nationals, and deposits and trusts 
abroad. Obligations of repatriation of overseas claims 
were eased. Restrictions on nonresidents’ domestic 
currency deposits and trusts with maturities of less than 
one year were eliminated, and the process of securities 
investment by foreigners was simplifi ed.
Further liberalization was introduced in April 2002, 
when the Korean government announced a plan for the 
development of the Korean foreign exchange market to 
support Korea’s emergence as a fi nance and logistics 
hub in Northeast Asia.
As a fi rst step in implementing the plan, in July 2002 
the Korean government eased the procedural regula-
tions concerned with individuals’ external payments, 
permitted securities companies and insurance com-
panies to participate in the interbank FX market, and 
allowed the internationalization of the Korean won.
The opening of the capital account resulted in large 
balance of payments surpluses. Current account 
surpluses averaged 2.2 percent of GDP, and capital 
account surpluses averaged 1.1 percent of GDP dur-
ing 2000–05. To prevent the appreciation of the 
Korean won, Korea’s central bank like many of its 
Asian peers intervened heavily in the FX market: 
during 2000–05 Korea’s FX reserves increased by 
$126 billion (Figure 6), giving rise to the heavy costs 
discussed earlier. During 2000–03, the value of the 
Korean won was maintained roughly constant on a 
real effective exchange rate (REER) basis, that is, 
on a trade-weighted basis adjusted for differences 
in infl ation with Korea’s trading partners. During 
2004–05, however, the Korean won was allowed to 
appreciate by about 25 percent on a REER basis.
The appreciation of the KRW during 2004–05 took 
place despite a stepped-up accumulation of reserves: 
annual FX reserve growth was 24 percent on average 
compared with 13 percent on average during 2001–02 
and 15 percent during 2005–06. The appreciation of 
the won during 2004–05 refl ected that capital and cur-
rent account infl ows were increasing sharply. The basic 
balance of payments (the sum of current account, FDI, 
and portfolio balances) peaked at $56 billion (about 9 
percent of GDP) in the year to May 2004, its highest 
level ever. This refl ected at least two factors: a lack of 
recovery in private investment after the crisis that led 
to large, persistent excess savings over investments as 
well as large infl ows of FDI and investment in Korean 
portfolio securities, as structural reforms and capital 
account opening enhanced the attractiveness of Korea 
as an investment destination.
Liberalization of FX Outfl ows Reducing Balance 
of Payments Surpluses
The surge in balance of payments surpluses prompted 
the Korean government to refocus FX policy on the lib-
eralization of capital outfl ows because greater capital 
outfl ows would alleviate the pressure on the Korean 
won to appreciate and the cost of large-scale sterilized 
intervention. In June 2005, the government announced 
its Overseas Investment Activation Plan, which abol-
ished the ceiling on overseas fi nance or insurance 
business investment by nonfi nancial institutions and 
expanded the limits on real estate acquisition abroad 
and overseas direct investment by individuals.
In 2006, the regulations on capital transactions were 
further simplifi ed, and limits on real estate acquisition 
abroad by residents, on overseas direct investment by 
individuals, on the overall net open positions of FX 
banks, and on the obligation for repatriation of over-
seas claims were expanded. In addition, the currency 
exchange business in Korean won by foreign fi nancial 
institutions was liberalized, and limitations on the im-
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Figure 6: Korea's Foreign Exchange Reserves Compared with the Real Effective Exchange Rate for 
the Korean Won, January 2000–November 2007
Source: CEIC Data Company, Ltd.
port and export of the Korean won for money exchange 
purposes were reduced. The government implemented 
further measures to support the internationalization of 
the Korean won, liberalization of FX transactions such 
as overseas investment by Korean nationals, and the 
upgrading of the FX market.
In January 2007, further measures to boost capital 
outfl ows were implemented: permitted institutional 
investors and overseas investment objects were ex-
panded, the limit on real estate acquisition abroad by 
residents intending to invest was raised, and the pro-
cess involved in making overseas direct investments 
was streamlined.
In 2006, Korea’s basic balance of payments swung into 
a defi cit, largely as a result of greater capital outfl ows 
(Figure 7). Outfl ows of FDI have increased as fi rms 
have moved abroad to increase their competitiveness 
or gain global scale. And portfolio outfl ows are in-
creasing steadily as Korean investors are increasing 
the international diversifi cation of their savings. At 
the same time, the current account surplus has been 
declining as household savings have fallen in line 
with their increasing indebtedness. In addition, the 
large and fast appreciation of the Korean won during 
2004–05 and the increase in the price of energy have 
further reduced the goods and services surplus. Korea 
is now the only country in Asia to be running a basic 
balance of payments defi cit.
Strength of Won Refl ects Expectations, Not 
Balance of Payments Strength
Despite the steady increase in the basic balance of 
payments defi cit, the value of the Korean won has 
not weakened much on a REER basis, and the won 
has steadily appreciated against the U.S. dollar. This 
apparent inconsistency refl ects the development of the 
FX derivatives market: the balance of payments data 
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capture only spot market FX transactions between on-
shore and offshore counterparties. Derivatives markets 
transactions (forwards, currency swaps, and options) 
get captured by the balance of payments statistics only 
to the extent that they give rise to an actual payment 
between onshore and offshore parties, and cash pay-
ments usually represent only a very small fraction of 
the notional value of derivatives contracts. Hence, the 
balance of payments data do not capture the full impact 
of derivatives fl ows on the spot exchange rate.
Derivative fl ows must have supported the appreciation 
of the Korean won because the balance of payments 
fl ows have been pointing in the direction of a weaker 
Korean won. The impact of forward transactions on 
spot is instantaneous because banks break forward 
transactions between a spot and forward desk. Cur-
rency swaps affect the spot over time as they are 
equivalent to a series of forward transactions. Options 
affect the spot rate through hedging that usually takes 
place through the forward market.
Transactions in the FX derivatives markets largely 
reflect hedging and funding activities as well as 
speculation. In Korea large exporters and importers 
usually have hedged FX receipts and outlays in the 
forward market; insurers, overseas investors, and 
banks have hedged their asset purchases or carried out 
funding activities in the swap market; and SMEs have 
usually hedged FX receipts and outlays in the option 
market. Forward sales of the U.S. dollar by export-
ers, especially shipbuilders, have recently received 
strong news coverage. While the current account 
surplus has been shrinking, export growth has been 
sustained at around 15 percent for the past 18 months 
while exports of ships have been growing at close to 
30 percent per year.
Speculation is generally taking place mainly through 
spot, forward, and swap markets and has played an im-
portant role in providing liquidity to the market. This is 
especially important because hedging transactions tend 
to be one-sided: if there is a market consensus on cur-
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rency appreciation, for example, market participants 
who are structurally long U.S. dollars (exporters or 
Korean corporates or investors who own U.S. dollar 
assets) are more likely to hedge than structurally short 
U.S. dollar market participants (importers or Korean 
corporates with U.S. dollar–denominated debt).
For instance, despite the current account’s falling into 
defi cit in the fi rst half of 2007, the six-month forward 
U.S. dollar–Korean won declined from a peak of about 
950 to a trough of about 910 in July, that is, priced a 
stronger appreciation of the Korean won. This largely 
refl ected strong export growth and hedging, that is, 
U.S. dollar forward sales by exporters. And, with the 
market consensus in favor of Korean won appreciation, 
importers did not hedge (buy U.S. dollars forward).
In the long run, however, appreciation of the Korean 
won is inconsistent with a current account defi cit. 
At 910, the six-month forward appeared oversold in 
view of the fundamentals, and speculators started to 
buy, which helped move the six-month forward back 
to about 940 in mid-August (the move also refl ected 
global equity market weaknesses). Without specula-
tors, the six-month forward could have fallen well 
below 910, and its volatility would have been higher. 
Higher forward volatility in turn increases corporate 
hedging costs and reduces the signaling value of the 
forward rate. (Of course, if speculators had expected 
the KRW to appreciate, they could have increased the 
volatility of the Korean won, but making wrong calls 
repeatedly would in the long run lead to speculators’ 
exiting the market).
As mentioned above, that derivatives fl ows support 
Korean won appreciation likely refl ects expectations 
of won appreciation. These likely refl ect a number of 
factors, including global U.S. dollar weakening; tight 
Korean monetary policy (in July and August 2007, the 
BOK hiked the policy rate by 25 basis points twice in a 
row, the fi rst time ever since the introduction of infl a-
tion targeting in 1999); and continued accumulation 
by the BOK of FX reserves, which signals pressure 
for the Korean won to appreciate.
In addition, as mentioned above, owing to an appar-
ent market consensus on appreciation of the Korean 
won, structurally long U.S. dollar market participants 
seem to be currently hedging more than structurally 
short U.S. dollar market participants. Hence, even 
though the overall basic balance is shrinking, balance 
of payments receipts are growing apace, which sup-
ports continued growth in hedging fl ows against won 
appreciation, that is, in short U.S. dollar positions.
To a large extent, therefore, appreciation of the 
Korean won is a “bubble”: the won is appreciating 
because market participants expect won appreciation. 
Any news that leads to a shift in expectations for the 
strength of the won—for instance, global U.S. dollar 
stabilization, markedly slower export growth, easing of 
monetary policy in Korea—could see exporters reduce 
their hedging and importers increase theirs. This could 
bring about a sharp weakening of the Korean won as 
both spot (the balance of payments) and derivatives 
markets transactions would then support the deprecia-
tion of the Korean won.
Regulatory Risk Could Slow Development of FX 
Market in Korea
Korea’s short-term foreign debt increased by $80.2 
billion to $146.1 billion in September 2007 from 
$65.9 billion in December 2005. Most of this increase 
refl ects an increase in banks’ short-term foreign bor-
rowings by $73.6 billion to $124.8 billion over the 
same period. Unlike the short-term foreign borrowings 
that led to the 1997 crisis, however, this accumulation 
of short-term debt does not represent a risk for fi nan-
cial or external stability. First, since 2006, the BOK 
has effectively banned lending in FX to unhedged 
borrowers; hence, this accumulation of debt does 
not create an open FX exposure. Second, these debts 
are largely self-liquidating, like trade credits, as they 
represent banks’ efforts to close the open FX exposure 
created largely by exporters’ sales of U.S. dollars. 
Smaller hedging fl ows from exporters will see banks’ 
outstanding short-term FX debts decline. And, even 
after this increase in short-term FX debts, the external 
liquidity position of Korea remains extremely strong. 
FX reserves at $261.5 billion represent 180 percent of 
short-term FX debts.
In addition, and as stressed by the International Mon-
etary Fund, foreign borrowing that merely closes an 
open FX position does not put pressure on the cur-
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rency, in contrast with unhedged external borrowing, 
which does.1 The source of the strength of the Korean 
won is hedging by structurally long U.S. dollar–market 
participants and market expectations of Korean won 
appreciation rather than banks’ short-term FX bor-
rowings. During September 2007, for example, banks 
made net repayments of short-term debts of $8 billion. 
Yet, during September 2007, the won appreciated from 
940 to 915 per U.S. dollar.
In July 2007, the Korean authorities announced that, 
in order to reduce short-term FX borrowings, the 
amount of tax-exempt interest rate costs on foreign 
banks’ borrowing from headquarters would be reduced 
on 1 January 2008 from six times foreign banks’ 
total equity to three times. The news proved to be 
very disruptive to the onshore FX market and led to 
substantial losses among Korean and foreign banks. 
In addition, the spot and forward U.S. dollar–Korean 
won exchange rates fell on the news, as the measure 
effectively represented an increase in the cost of U.S. 
dollar funding and, hence, increased the forward 
discount (the appreciation of the Korean won priced 
in by the forward exchange rate). More recently, the 
new measure has added to a shortage of onshore U.S. 
dollar liquidity that has emerged after this summer’s 
increase in global fi nancial market volatility.
There is a risk that these unexpected regulatory 
changes could lead banks to curtail their participation 
in Korea’s FX market, which could set back Korea’s 
plans to become Northeast Asia’s fi nance and logis-
tics hub. If the Korean authorities feel that the recent 
increase in short-term FX debt is a source of concern, 
perhaps this could be better addressed through tighter 
prudential rules on banks’ U.S. dollar liquidity ratios 
rather than through an increase in their funding costs 
that has generated market volatility, has made it more 
diffi cult to hedge, and has not prevented appreciation 
of the Korean won. Even better, a reduction in FX 
intervention by the BOK and further liberalization of 
the capital account could help weaken expectations 
of Korean won appreciation and bring about more 
balanced fl ows on the FX market.
Ms. Dwor-Frécaut is an economist covering Asian 
fi nancial markets for ABN-AMRO bank.
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